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THE PRICE OF PATRIOTISM
ALBERTA CATTLEMEN AND THE LOSS OF THE AMERICAN
MARKET, 194 2~48

MAX FORAN

neither anticipated nor appreciated by western Canadian stockmen. Their efforts to restore a market deemed crucial to their
industry's survival, and the government's
seeming failure to appreciate the stockmen's
position, clearly showed that the "price of patriotism" went beyond merely fighting a war.
Since its inception in the early 1880s, the
western Canadian cattle industry depended
on export markets. Although home consumption accounted for about ninety percent of
Canadian cattle marketings, it was the exportable ten percent that determined domestic
prices and defined the quality standard for
Canadian beef.! Over the years only two markets absorbed this annual surplus of between
15Q,000 and 200,000 head. The first was in
Great Britain where demand for Canadian
cattle helped nurture the western Canadian
ranching industry up to 1907. This market
was eclipsed after 1914 when relaxation of the
American tariff encouraged the southward
movement of Canadian cattle. This new
American outlet for both fat stock and feeder
cattle was so profitable that by 1920 it had
become axiomatic among Canadian cattlemen
that their industry's survival depended upon

One of the most controversial episodes in
the history of the western Canadian cattle industry occurred during the years 1942-48 when
the Canadian government imposed an embargo on Canadian cattle entering the United
States. This unprecedented measure was a reaction to the extraordinary demands of the
national war effort, and was accepted conditionally by the cattle industry as a necessary
patriotic gesture. However, official wartime
policies respecting this embargo, and its retention beyond the war until late 1948 were
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its availability.2 As such, much of the Canadian stockmen's economic travail between
1921 and 1935 was blamed on the renewed
American tariffs of 1921-22 and 1930, that
imposed daunting levies of between two and
three cents per pound and which, especially
during the years 1921-25 and 1930-34, made
it virtually impossible to ship cattle profitably
to United States points. 3
Despite its popularity among western Canadian cattlemen, the American market did
not figure highly in the emerging Canadian
agricultural policies of the period. It was perceived as unstable and subject to tariff volatility. More important, however, was the
Canadian federal government's commitment
to the British market as the most dependable
and permanent outlet for its agricultural products. Especially after the Imperial Conference
of 1932, when Britain formally abandoned her
century-old commitment to free trade in favor of a system of imperial preference, Canadian policymakers became convinced that they
had at last secured a market to absorb the
nation's growing agricultural surpluses. That
these agricultural policies were built around
the British need for wheat and pork, and not
cattle, mattered little in the new scheme of
things. Cattle exports emerged as an add-on
entity, one not really needed nor even wanted
by Great Britain and certainly not a factor to
the Canadian beef producer who realized that
the British market was simply not viable in
normal circumstances, and was but a pale replacement for the country's natural market in
the United States.
There can be little doubt that the American market for Canadian cattle was volatile.
For instance, there were no fewer than nine
US tariff revisions between 1881 and 1940.
One has only to note the strenuous efforts by
Canadian producers to pressure the United
States to remove the 1920s tariff, or the recent action taken by an American group of
producers (R-CALF) in 1999 to bring antidumping and countervailing duty cases against
Canada, to realize the ever-present tensions
between the industries in the two countries. 4

In 1935 the Americans responded to
Britain's policy of imperial preference through
tariff revisions that allowed reciprocal agreements covering certain products. Under two
trade agreements reached in 1935 and 1939,
Canada was allowed to ship a certain number
of cattle to the United States at reduced rates
of duty.s In 1935 the levy on an assigned quota
of Canadian cattle over 700 pounds was reduced by one-third to two cents per pound
and later in 1939 to one and one-half cents
per pound. In addition, Canada was given 86.5
percent of the American annual import quota
of 225,000 head, with no more than 51,750
head to be shipped in anyone quarter. Surplus
cattle shipped over and above the quarterly
quota were subject to the regular duty rates.
The impact of these trade relations was both
immediate and dramatic. In 1934 Canada exported only 6,341 head to the United States.
In 1935 the number had jumped to 102,934
and two years later reached 208,552. 6 In 1939,
the winter quarterly quota was filled in one
month. 7 By 1940, in the wake of rising prices
and consumer demand, over 229,000 head
made their way south. s With a natural equilibrium partially restored, Canadian stockmen
entered the war period on a positive note,
confident that the renewed American market
would enable them to recoup some of the losses
incurred during the early 1920s and 1930&.
Through 1940-41 and into 1942, this quotaregulated market remained open. American
lend-lease commitments and her armament
priorities meant a steady demand and rising
prices for Canadian cattle. Even though home
demand for beef escalated in response to
Canada's commitment of huge amounts of
bacon under the "Bacon to Britain" program,
Canadian cattlemen genuinely believed that
they could contribute to the war effort by
satsifying both the home and export market. 9
The official voice of western Canadian cattle
interests, the Western Stock Growers Association (WSGA), reflected the stockmen's
commitment to increased production by passing a resolution in 1940 assuring the government of "our earnest desire to assist and
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co-operate by every means in our power to
prosecute to a successful conclusion of the
waLlO

In the spring of 1942, with a dramatic suddenness, the cry of meat shortage was raised in
eastern Canada. ll Headlines in the eastern
Canadian press condemned cattle producers
for creating this shortage by holding back supplies in favor of the more lucrative American
market. 12 It was also suggested that in order to
protect Canadian supplies, all cattle exports
to the United States should be stopped. 13
There seems to be little justification for
this criticism of the cattle producers. lhe
Department of Agriculture was sufficiently
upset over the matter to issue a public statement on 17 April that referred to increased
production, and which stated in part that
"strong exception is taken ... to widely publicized implications that farmers have created
a shortage of beef by withholding cattle from
the market in order to obtain higher prices in
the United States."14 The department had a
point, for while shipments to the United States
had increased by 59,442 in the January-May
1942 period in comparison with the same period in 1941, the number of head sold to Canadian stockyards and packing plants in the
same period was up by 47,222.15 At the time
the shortage cry was raised the American export quota had not been filled. 16
It was likely other factors unrelated to live
cattle marketings were more responsible for
the proclaimed shortage. Frozen beef supplies
had been reduced through a substantial and
largely unexplained increase in the amount of
dressed meat shipped to the United States in
the first three monrhs of 1942 over 1941 levels. 1) Second, short-term pressure had been
placed on beef supplies by the increased restriction on pork consumption. Another factor concerned the packing industry and its
response to the recently enacted government
controls. In the fall of 1941, ceiling prices were
placed on all goods by the newly constituted
Wartime Prices and Trade Board. The ceiling
was to be the highest price obtained during a
base period of 15 September to 11 October
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1941. 18 When a new board ruling in March
1942 compelled the packers to sell to their
individual customers at the same price as they
had sold to that customer during the base period, many refused to sell, especially to the big
retailers who had purchased at a low ceiling
price. 19
The cattle producers' role in creating the
shortage (and it was never really ascertained
that there was a shortage) was related to the
fact that the new ceilings, which did not allow
for any seasonal adjustment. This meant that
the more expensive grain-fed cattle came to
market under the same domestic price ceiling
as grass-fed range beef, a situation exacerbated
by the fact that the ceilings were not on live
cattle but on dressed beef (or the product sold
to retailers by the packers). One predicable
reaction for feeders facing heavy losses was to
take advantage of the higher US prices and
export as many grain-finished animals as possible within the allowed quota. 20
The WSGA first heard rumor of a proposed
embargo on 31 March 1942. At a special meeting called the same date, a dispatch was sent
to Ottawa requesting for clarification. In the
ensuing discussion, it became clear that the
WSGA's preference Was for an adjustable ceiling that would reward the feeder and also
maintain the export trade. 21 Less than a month
later, producers across western Canada were
invited to Winnipeg by F. S. Grisdale, deputy
food administrator under the Wartime Prices
and Trade Board, to discuss the situation. At
this meeting the producers rejected a suggestion by Grisdale that the government buy all
surplus beef and divert it to export as necessary.22 Despite these sentiments, an order in
council was passed on 20 May conferring on
the Wartime Prices and Trade Board the power
to control the export of cattle whenever shortages in the domestic supply occurred. 23 Then
on 29 May the board announced a new comprehensive plan of action. The Wartime Food
Corporation was to be formed to regulate the
export trade through the issuance of export
licences covering individual shipments and to
divert cattle from export as deemed necessary
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to maintain satisfactory price levels. Diverted
export shipments would receive the prevailing US price and would be resold to packers at
a loss to maintain prices below the ceiling. 24
This new corporation was to begin operations
on 1 July 1942.
The WSGA announced its official response
during its annual convention inJune. The right
to the U.S. export market was couched as an
obligation given her enormous commitments
under the lend-lease agreements. 21 In expressing a desire to work closely with government
and to increase production to meet expanding demands, WSGA President George L.
Stringham left no doubt as to where the association stood on the export question: "Let no
one delude themselves; should our export
market to the States be lost ... Mexico will
gain it and at the conclusion of the war it
would be most difficult and probably impossible for us again to enter it on the same
favourable basis."26 Clearly, the sentiments
were meant to caution the Food Corporation
not to abandon the export trade in exercising
its mandate. The warning however fell on deaf
ears.
Within a week of its inception the Food
Corporation was condemned by the WSGA
as hopelessly inefficient. Calls for disbandment met with flat refusals from Donald Gordon, chairman of the Wartime Prices and
Trade BoardY Time would eventually vindicate the WSGA's position. The diversion of
exports up to the quarterly quota of 51,000
proved to be chaotically mismanaged. The
WSGA argued that the US price for diverted
export cattle was compromised by the Food
Corporation's practice of moving carloads of
animals from point to point to obtain lower
appraisals. 28 Some stockmen violated the intent of the new policy by declaring substandard animals fit for export. 29 Then in the
middle of August, when the Food Corporation announced that the export quota had
been filled and that the Canadian ceiling
would replace the higher export price, many
producers simply withdrew their animals from
the market in anticipation of the new quar-

terly quota commencing in October when the
US export price would again be paid. 30
Faced with this chaotic situation, and in
light of Gordon's refusal to abolish the Food
Corporation or at least amend its mandate,
the WSGA called a special meeting on 25
August. 3 ! After an all-day discussion a committee of five was struck to frame resolutions
to be forwarded to the federal government.
Two motions were brought forward. The motion to have the Food Corporation pay the
export price for all the cattle it needed and to
sell the rest in the open market was defeated.
The second resolution calling for the Food
Corporation to export surplus cattle to maintain a ceiling flexible enough to reflect real
production costs was passed unanimously. The
defeat of the first motion and the unanimous
acceptance of the second was a clear indication that the WSGA was prepared to give up
the export price but not the export market.
In later debates with the government, the
WSGA would always argue that the intent of
this unanimous motion clearly indicated its
willingness to temporarily abrogate its members' hard-earned right to export and furthermore to accept the much lower Canadian
ceiling price for their cattleY Moreover, the
motion's preamble stated that the Wartime
Prices and Trade Board did intend to maintain the export market (or so the WSGA believed). The defeat of the first motion, together
with the tenor of the discussions at the various directors' and general meetings, reaffirmed
the WSGA's priorities. The stockmen genuinely believed that some sacrifice was necessary on their part in order to maintain
satisfactory domestic beef supplies and prices.
They felt that price ceilings in line with production costs afforded them adequate protection. Most importantly, they were of the
opinion that the export market to the United
States was not going to be abandoned and
would continue to be utilized by the Food
Corporation when increased supply put downward pressure on prices.
It could also be argued that the stockmen
were worried by the alarming trend in the black
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market trade, a practice already viewed as
threatening the industry's stability by jeopardizing price controls and driving the price of
beef upward to a point where consumers could
not or would not buy.33 One report estimated
that at least 20 percent of beef slaughtered in
the United States went to black marketeers.
In January 1943 the Montreal Star quoted representatives of two packing houses who maintained that most Montrealers were eating black
market beef. During a debate on the subject in
the House of Commons, one M.P. quoted figures that showed that the number of inspected
killings in eastern Canada actually fell in 1942
in spite of the large increase in western Canadian shipments to eastern points. 34
Almost immediately following the WSGA
meeting of 25 August, the Food Corporation
announced "a complete change in the governmental policy of handling the beef cattle industry." All cattle exports to the United States
were terminated except by the Food Corporation. Conditions under which it would now
operate mirrored closely the WSGA resolution of 25 August. 35 The WSGA responded in
a press release affirming the new policy and
terming it "the only action to have taken under the circumstances."36 The WSGA could
be excused for believing that the new government policy, both in its intent and timing,
was a tacit acceptance of the position the association had adopted at its 25 August meeting.
The Food Corporation, however, did not
honor the intent of the new policy. Instead of
exporting surplus cattle, it retained them in
cold storage pending future needs. From a
promise to buy and export any surplus, the
policy changed to one of buying when a surplus developed, processing and storing it, and
exporting only in the unlikely event of this
reserve being depleted. By the time the Food
Corporation was phased out in early 1943, not
a single head had been exported. Furthermore, the producers continued to expand production, acceding to the government's request
that cattle be kept longer to increase overall
tonnage. 37
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In March 1943 in a possible response to
ongoing differences between the Wartime
Prices and Trade Board and the Department
of Agriculture over food administration policies, the federal government reshuffled its food
marketing organization. Responsibility for the
marketing of cattle passed to the Department
of Agriculture through the newly constituted
Meat Board (formerly the Bacon Board), which
promised to buy dressed beef at scheduled variable floor prices. The substitution of the Food
Corporation by a more autonomous Meat
Board had significant implications. Instead of
buying beef under the ceilings in competition
with the packers, the Meat Board could now
purchase beed unilaterally at the new floor
prices. The cost of subsidizing consumers to
keep prices down had in effect shifted from
the government to the producer. And as if to
add insult to injury, from the stockmen's viewpoint, the responsibility for the export of live
cattle, i.e., the US market, continued to devolve on the Wartime Prices and Trade Board
and not the Department of Agriculture. Later
the latter was to use this jurisdictional difference to parry the stockmen seeking a renewal
of the US live cattle export market.
In June 1943 the Meat Board clearly
showed the official priority respecting
Canada's beef export market when Chairman
J. G. McTaggart announced that "we will in
effect be providing a beef market in the United
Kingdom as a substitute for the live beef cattle
market in the U.S. which has been restricted."38 While the policy of diverting surplus beef to war-torn Britain could not be
faulted on patriotic grounds, it was also consistent with prewar Canadian agricultural
policy that saw Britain as the ideal terminus
for Canadian beef exports, a preference with
which the stockmen had always taken strong
exception. 39
Western Canadian stockmen correctly believed that the British market for their cattle
functioned as a safety valve in times when its
American counterpart was curtailed. 40 They
indicated to the high ocean freight rates and
the furious competition from Argentina and
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the Irish Free State as putting their marketings
at a crippling disadvantage. Significant movements of Canadian cattle to Great Britain after 1906 occurred only in the early 1920s and
1930s and were forced solely by the inhibiting
US tariffs on Canadian exports. When US
prices were favorable the British market was
of little or no consequence. 41
The official policy had always been different, doubtless inspired by imperial sentiment
and a residual mistrust of American tariff
policy. Federal experiments to develop a
chilled beef trade with Britain in the 1920s
and its series of baby beef shipments in the
1930s, though both unsuccessful, clearly
showed that the British market considered
this a viable and more desirable outlet than
the volatile American-governed alternative. 42
Dominion Livestock Commissioner H. S.
Arkell stated the government case in 1939. In
referring to the fierceness of international
competition, and warning about the fickleness of the US market, Arkell indirectly castigated the beef producers, and reiterated the
official position that Canada's best place was
under the imperial wing: '~The Empire preference which we enjoy in the sale of food
products to the United Kingdom together
with the stabilization of price under British
policy which safeguards the position of Canadians ... constitutes a trading advantage
which is or should be worth more to Canadians than I think she really yet understands."43 Federal Agriculture Minister James
Gardiner, an avowed proponent of the British market, was even more explicit when he
told the House of Commons on 3 March 1944
that "Canada has a double opportunity in
supplying surplus beef to the United Kingdom at present to meet urgent needs and to
build a market there for the post war
years." 44 Gardiner had been a vital agent in
shaping Canadia's agricultural policy since the
mid-1930s, and World War II only intensified his commitment toward maintaining the
British market in postwar years. The highly
contentious wheat agreement, which tarnished his reputation as a skilled bargainer,

was one unhappy legacy of this commitment
to empire. 45
Despite its implications, the replacement
of the American market by the British was not
pivotal in inspiring the resentment that threw
the export issue once more into the forefront
by the spring of 1944. Rather it was the problem of falling live cattle prices. Feedlot beef
tonnage was up in response to the government plea for increased production. 46 Yet a
government coarse grains subsidy had the effect of raising feeding costs since it was not
applicable to either commercial or farmer purchases of grain for feeding purposes. Another
problem was caused by discrepancies between
live cattle prices on which there was no price
control and that of the packer-controlled
dressed beef floors and ceilings. 47 The relaxing
of restrictions on domestic pork sales in the
second half of 1943 put further downward pressure on beef prices. Added to the stockmen's
woes was the negative impact caused by the
cessation of big construction projects in the
north and the resulting large-scale troop relocations. 48 By early 1944 the value of feeder
cows was below the corresponding floor price. 49
In March 1944 a large gathering of cattle
producers at Lethbridge reaffirmed the right
to the US market in the light of the September 1942 policy statement by the Wartime
Prices and Trade Board that it would export
surplus live cattle to support domestic price
levels. 50 The Canadian Federation of Agriculture followed up with its own resolution calling for the removal of the American embargo,
and a month later the WSGA asked the government to "take steps to move surplus cattle
to the US immediately."51
It WaS clear, however, that the federal government had no intention of considering the
US market, arguing first that any attempt to
reopen it would result in an embargo on Canadian cattle since, despite higher prices, the
American producer was actually getting less
for his cattle than a year previously.52 Secondly, it was stated that the resumption of
shipments to the United States would simply
mean that the latter would have to increase its
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lend-lease shipments, and that Canada was
better suited to utilize her own like program
to ship more cattle to needy areas. 53
In July 1944 Gardiner announced the
completion of negotiations to supply the
United Kingdom with a minimum of 100 million pounds of beef during the period 194445, and furthermore to furnish the same market
with all surpluses as they became available. 54
Aside from the fact that the US market was
now completely discounted, this new contract
had mixed results for cattlemen. On the one
hand, they were assured the domestic floor
price since the Canadian Treasury made up
the difference between what the United Kingdom could afford to pay and the Canadian
floor price. 55 However, this new year-round
floor, which was revised on the basis of the
United Kingdom contract, meant there was
little incentive for feeders to carry their animals through to a quality finish. 56
The heavy fall marketings in 1944 showed
that cattlemen were not fully protected by the
much-heralded British beef contract. Simply
put, Canadian processing facilities could not
handle the volume of livestock being moved
through them. In the first forty-five weeks of
1944, cattle marketings alone were up by
200,000 over the same period a year earlier. 57
The congestion was so great that some central
markets placed embargoes on cattle from western shipping points. Those stockmen with
short feed supplies could not hold their animals over for sale at a later date. 58 The results
were diminished sales, a general trend toward
lower prices, and a futile plea from stockmen
to add floor and ceiling prices to live cattle as
well the existing schedules on dressed beef.
As the war came to a close in the spring of
1945, the question of reopening the American market gained more currency among stock
growers. At this early stage, sentiments were
low key. The Lethbridge Herald called for a
token number of cattle to be bought at Canadian prices and shipped to the United States
as a way of reasserting claim to a market "given
up with great trepidation."59 In responding to
the renewed commitment to supply beef to
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Britain beyond the war, the editor of the Farm
and Ranch Review resignedly commented that
"as long as Britain demands all of Canada's
exportable meat supply, it will be difficult to
convince Ottawa that beef cattle should be
allowed to cross the line."60 InJuly the Alberta
Federation of Agriculture passed a motion to
its parent body, the Canadian Federation of
Agriculture, calling for the resumption of
cattle exports to the United States. 61
What really spurred the cattlemen into action was the realization that the Canadian
government was serious about maintaining the
British market after the war and possibly on a
permanent basis. Experience had taught them
that Britain was not and never could be a reliable outlet for their cattle. A livestock expert told the Canadian Society of Animal
Production (Western Section) in June 1945
that Canada could not compete with cheap
beef nations like Argentina, Australia, and
Uruguay once peace-time trade relations had
been reestablished. 62 The sentiment was echoed four months later by J. S. McLean, president, Canadian Packers Limited, when he said
that "with stabilization the British market will
again discriminate against higher Canadian
prices."63 In February 1946 J. P. Sackville, a
prominent agriculturalist at the University of
Alberta, warned that the British market in
the long term was "a cause of concern."64 Critics were quick to point out that the present
profitability of the British market was misleading since the wartime purchases of Canadian meat were supported partially by the
Canadian taxpayer through Britain's extensive Mutual Aid loans. With the termination
of such loans, Britain would follow tradition
and shut out Canada completely by buying in
the cheapest market.
In July 1946 the Meat Board Chairman
McTaggart told the annual convention of the
WSGA that he believed that Britain would
take all of Canada's export cattle through to
the end of 1948, and that the American market was secondary to these more urgent postwar needs. Then in October, Agricultural
Minister Gardiner announced the signing of a
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new beef contract to supply a minimum of
120 million pounds of beef to Britain through
each of the years 1947 and 1948. With this
announcement, the stockmen realized the seriousness of their situation. Prices for the new
British contract were in line with the Canadian floor price for beef, and while reasonable, were well below what they could expect
in the United States. 65 In December 1945, for
example, Canadian prices were $6.50 per hundredweight below their American counterparts. 66
In the face of the rising costs of home production the federal governments refusal to raise
the ceilings on beef, the stockmen intensified
their pressure throughout 1947 to have the
American market re-opened. They were also
fearful over the implications of the 1944 USMexico cattle agreement, which removed the
quota and reduced the duty on Mexican cattle
exports to the United StatesY The National
Council of Beef Producers succeeded in having a recommendation for the embargo's removal placed on the Canadian Federation of
Agriculture's brief to the federal cabinet. The
WSGA and the Northern Alberta Livestock
Breeders also passed motions favoring the resumption of trade with the United States. 68
As if in answer to the stockmen's prayers, the
terms of the international Geneva Trade
Agreement were announced in November
1947. Under this agreement, which covered a
wide variety of agricultural products, the
United States agreed to increase the annual
quota on live cattle imports from 225,000 to
400,000 head and maintain the duty on cattle
over 700 pounds at 1.5 cents per pound. 69
Described as "a great boon to prairie agriculture," the Geneva Agreement heralded a major victory for the cattlemen who entered 1948
with every confidence that their lost market
would again be opened to them when the agreement took effect on 1 January 1948. 70
They were wrong. On 15 January 1948, in
one of the most amazing addresses ever given
before the Western Stock Growers Association, Agriculture Minister James Gardiner told
convention delegates in Lethbridge that a re-

opening of the American export market was
not in the nations's or the cattleman's best
interests. 71 He cautioned cattle producers
against tying themselves to the vagaries of US
prices and becoming hostages to another
country's production-cost cycles. He also emphasized the current US focus on cereal production at the expense of livestock as
indicating an American disinterest in Canadian cattle. Gardiner also warned of the disastrous effects on Canadian price controls should
the US market be open. His solution was to
tie Canadian floor prices to a stable and permanent British market, one he referred to as
"the freest and most satisfactory market in the
world." After reiterating his intention of not
breaking away from agricultural policy that
had put Canada in "the soundest position in
regards to agriculture that she has ever occupied," Gardiner concluded his speech with
imperialist rhetoric reminiscent of a bygone
era. His Britain was "the mother of nations, a
land which has led us all and which can still
lead us all ... a nation which has led the world
in the establishment of democratic institutions
... freedom ... and sound finance based on
sterling."
All in all, it was an incredible and, some
would say, courageous performance. Certainly,
it was consistent with Gardiner's longstanding
belief in the superiority of Great Britain as a
long-range stable market for Canadian cattle.
There also can be little doubt that his speech
referred to more than cattle. Desperate for
Canadian agricultural stability in the postwar
era, Gardiner had clearly decided that the sterling area offered the best opportunities for trade
in wheat, hogs, other cereal crops, and cattle,
in that order.72 And certainly he must have
also been convinced that Britain would continue its policy of imperial preference even in
the face of far cheaper Argentinean beef products.
Following his delivery, Gardiner was subjected to heated and angry questions from the
floor. And while he parried them with extensive statistical data his words fell on deaf
ears. The audience, that had, according to one
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observer, "sat in grim silence" throughout
Gardiner's speech, could not understand the
minister's naivete. To them, the British market would simply doom them to extinction. A
unanimous resolution was passed the next day
calling for the opening of the American market. During the debate on the motion, George
Ross, Chairman of the Canadian Council of
Beef Producers, called for western Canada's
secession from Canada should the American
market be kept from them. 73 A Pincher Creek
rancher summed up the sentiments with a more
thoughtful reminder that cattlemen were not
about to admit that government should run
their affairs or that agriculture should be used
to stabilize the country's whole economy."74
Over the ensuing months the WSGA, supported by the National Council of Beef producers, pressured the government to change
its position, arguing that Argentina could sell
dressed beef to Britain at a price lower than
live cattle were bringing in western Canada,
and that a reopened American market would
add badly needed dollars to Canada's balance
of payment deficit. Although Gardiner was
quoted as late as May that he had no idea
when the embargo was to be lifted, the end
came with dramatic suddenness less than three
months later. On 13 August, Gardiner announced that cattle exports to the United
States would be resumed effective 16 August

1948.
The reasons for this sudden turnaround in
policy were probably threefold. First, the message about the economic tenuousness of the
British market had at last begun to make an
impact in official circles, especially in light of
the intensive lobby conducted by the various
national and regional stock associations in the
spring and early summer of 1948. 71 It was
known, for instance, that Finance, Minister
Douglas Abbott had long been in favor of removal of export restrictions to the United
States. Second, with Canadian and American
cattle prices beginning to converge, and the
Canadian dollar now on par with the American, the fear of rampant inflation was lessened. 76 Yet probably the most pivotal factor
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was the failure of secret talks between the two
governments on a free-trade deal. 77 Faced with
a dollar deficit of $1.041 billion in 1947, Canadian officials had approached the Americans in the fall seeking some sort of solution
in the form of a loan and a comprehensive
trade agreement, while hinting at long-range
import restrictions without them. Realizing
the importance of trade between the two countries and possibly wanting to disrupt the
present system of imperial tariffs, the Americans responded favorably. By mid-March the
basis for a general agreement had been settled.
The overall plan included, among other things,
the immediate removal of all duties by both
countries for five years and joint consultation
on agricultural marketing. Opposition to the
proposed agreement included Gardiner, of
course, and Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of
State for External Affairs and Prime Minister
King's heir apparent. On 6 May 1948 a vacillating Mackenzie King finally scuttled the
whole deal ostensibly on the grounds that he
could not conceive of a Liberal Party placing
Canada at the mercy of powerful financial influences in the United States. In the light of
this failure to achieve a sweeping trade agreement, the resumption of live cattle exports
was a recognition that Canada had not completely closed the door to the multilateral trade
arrangements so favored by the United States.
The cattlemen had at last achieved their
goal. In the four and one-half month period
following the reopening of the US market,
300,000 head went south, realizing a total of
$60 million in American dollars.78 The mood
at the fifty-third annual convention of the
Western Stock Growers Association in January 1949 was buoyant. In his report President
Charles Mackinnon, referring to the lifting of
the embargo, called 1948 one of the most important years in the history of the association. 79 WSGA Secretary Ken Coppock
probably best summed up the general opinion
of western Canadian cattlemen when he told
a radio audience in October 1949 that "the
industry has now returned to logic and
fact .... The future outlook has changed; the
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fundamentals of the industry are now sound."80
That their industry had not figured prominently on Gardiner's wider stage of agricultural trade policy, or that the government itself
had failed to follow through on its perceived
commitment to resume normal operations in
peacetime, did not seem to matter in the new
euphoria that accompanied the lifting of the
embargo. To practical men in changing times,
it was simply good to return to "business as
usual."
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